Should iran be allowed to have nuclear weapons

Meanwhile, Iranian clerical, civilian, and military leaders have repeatedly expressed their intention to wipe Israel off of the map. The United Nations Security Council also enacted sanctions against Iran for its nuclear proliferation activity. This step could considerably decrease the breakout time that it would take for Iran to build a nuclear weapon.

On July 7 Iran also declared it was enriching uranium beyond 3. In response, the Britain, France and Germany triggered the dispute-settlement mechanism part of the agreement, which could result in the UN Security Council re-imposing some of the sanctions that had been lifted as part of the deal. Since the revolution which overthrew the monarchy, Iran has been run by a Shia Islamist regime which has violently suppressed internal dissent. Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the country's powerful Supreme Leader, is the ultimate authority in the Islamic Republic, and it is he who makes the major policy decisions.

There have been periods when it appeared that the Iranian leadership was opting for some relative moderation and reform. This occurred with the election of Mohamed Khatami, considered the "reformist candidate" to the presidency in While the Khatami government through was marked by some moderation in Iran's public stance towards the West, the Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, tightly controlled most of the state apparatus.

Indeed, Iran's nuclear weapons program also intensified during this period. Iran's regime is a source of extremism and destabilization in the region and around the globe.

As noted above, Iran is generally considered to be the leading state sponsor of terrorism, providing financial support and training for organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, Islamic Jihad and many Shiite insurgents in Iraq. Iran is responsible for the bombings of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, Argentina, which together killed over people and wounded hundreds more. Iran has supplied the Assad regime with financial and military support, and its proxy Hezbollah and other associated militia has been a core component in the Syrian fighting force.

According to the U. This has led to varied expert opinions about whether these organizational changes were just a reorganized—albeit less urgent—nuclear weapons program , or an effort to keep the former program on ice in case Iran decided to turn it back on at a future date. The U. Iranian entities are continuing to develop a range of technical capabilities that could be applied to producing nuclear weapons, if a decision is made to do so.

For example. We also assess with high confidence that since fall , Iran has been conducting research and development projects with commercial and conventional military applications—some of which would also be of limited use for nuclear weapons. As of , the United States also continued to believe that Iran was not currently engaged in the most important activities associated with building a nuclear bomb.

This has made its activities of high interest to the international community and the IAEA. From to , five Iranian scientists with connections to the nuclear program were assassinated. At least two of those individuals—Majid Shariari and Masoud Alimohammadi—were key individuals in the former weapons program and were involved in plans to continue with some research activities after the halt.

Ferydoun Abbasi-Davani, who was the target of a failed assassination attempt and who would eventually go on to become the head of the AEOI, was also involved in those weaponization research efforts. These assassinations, continued IAEA investigations , and the theft of the archives have surely resulted in significant pressure , embarrassment , as well as perhaps even the loss of morale and expertise.

For example, nonproliferation experts have noted that Fakhrizadeh was not irreplaceable and had likely passed on his knowledge to the next generation of Iranian scientists. This is not to say that building a bomb would be impossible for Iran or that new hurdles would be insurmountable, only that it would take longer and be harder than it might have been years ago. How could this have happened? True, others within the military research establishment may have similar expertise as those assassinated, and Iran could certainly develop new plans and repeat old experiments.

But doing so may take longer than if Iran had those scientists and information at the ready. If, for example, Fakhrizadeh was merely a figurehead with little responsibility or sway, then his assassination may mean little.

But if, as some accounts suggest , he was the glue that held the former nuclear weapons cadre together and was a source of nuclear weapons advocacy within the regime, then his assassination could have a far greater impact.

In addition to the potential for reduced capacity for weaponization work, many of these factors above also raise the question of whether it would be wise for Iran to use this group for a resumed weapons project. The theft of the archives, continued IAEA investigations, and assassinations make it abundantly clear that this group and their work have been penetrated by foreign intelligence organizations and are under an international microscope.

The IAEA has, if anything, become more vocal about its concerns over the past few years and continues to insist that Iran provide answers. This raises major questions about whether Iran could keep a nuclear weapons program run by SPND a secret and whether Iranian leaders would actually turn to SPND for a renewed weapons program.

If Iran concludes the risks of turning to SPND are too high, but yet it still perceives a need to begin a covert weapons program, where else might Iran turn to for bomb-making assistance? Although using these IAEA-monitored capabilities to actually dash toward the bomb would be highly risky, the skills and expertise could be applied to covert projects.

There is no credible evidence that Iran has ever received assistance from North Korea on nuclear weapons, but reports of resumed missile cooperation highlight that this is a connection that must continue to be monitored.

So if the JCPOA cannot be saved, what are the policy implications, and what options should the United States pursue given the developments identified above? Genevieve Hackman and Dilan Koc provided research assistance for this brief. The author would also like to thank Kelsey Davenport, Ariel Levite, and Vann Van Diepen for their valuable feedback on an earlier draft.

This report is made possible by general support to CSIS. No direct sponsorship contributed to this report. But he and others caution that there is no evidence that Iran is rushing to build a bomb — at least not yet. Tensions between Iran and the United States have escalated in the past month. In response, Iran shot missiles at US bases in Iraq.

The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action JCPOA , the deal between Iran and six global powers that limited its nuclear capabilities in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions, is now in serious jeopardy. US President Donald Trump pulled out of the deal in May , and Iran announced in May last year that it would resume uranium enrichment.

Nature talked to nuclear experts to find out how soon Iran can build a bomb, and whether this is likely to happen. Building nuclear weapons is expensive and requires technical expertise, such as enriching uranium. Iran has a strong physical-sciences tradition, and has had an active nuclear programme for decades. The country has always maintained that this was purely for peaceful purposes, such as producing isotopes for medical use.

But in the early s, Iran appeared to have a crash programme to build at least five uranium fission bombs, according to US intelligence assessments and international observers. In , bowing to international pressure, the country agreed to cut down its nuclear activities drastically — but not completely. US president Dwight Eisenhower initials the first international agreement for the peaceful use of atomic energy, in Credit: Alamy.

Uranium is commonly processed as uranium hexafluoride gas, which is separated by isotope in high-speed centrifuges, and Iran had more than 10, of these centrifuges. When the JCPOA was signed in July , experts had estimated that the country was months — perhaps weeks — away from producing weapons-grade uranium.

In the following years, the agency periodically reported that Iran was fully complying with the deal. In , the United States unilaterally withdrew, imposing new, crushing economic sanctions on Iran. Mousavian says that Iranians felt cheated.